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All in the Family: 
Economies of Scale in Retail and Institutional Investment Management 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the (dis)economies of scale related to the joint management of retail mutual 
funds and institutional funds (i.e., investment portfolios catering to institutional clients). Similar 
to well-known observations for mutual funds, the performance of institutional funds is negatively 
related to fund size but positively related to fund family size, suggesting diseconomies of scale at 
individual fund level and economies of scale at fund family level. More importantly, there is 
spillover of the family size effect -- the performance of mutual funds (institutional funds) is 
positively related to the total institutional assets (mutual fund assets) managed by the same firms. 
We also find that certain types of funds -- e.g., larger mutual funds and institutional funds with 
higher fees -- benefit more from this spillover effect, suggesting that large investment firms are 
able to deploy firm-wide resources to favor a subset of funds that are of high value to the firms. 
However, there is no evidence that jointly managed funds, either retail or institutional, perform 
worse than independently managed ones. Overall, our findings suggest that the prevalence of 
jointly managed retail and institutional funds is consistent with economies of scale in the 
investment management industry.   
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I. Introduction 
Institutional funds are delegated investment portfolios managed by external investment 
advisory firms and catering to institutional clients such as pensions, insurers, foundations, and 
university endowments. By assets under management, the institutional fund industry is 
comparable in size to the retail mutual fund industry, and dwarfs the hedge fund industry.2  
Institutional funds and retail mutual funds serve different investor clienteles, take different 
product forms, and are subject to different regulations. Nevertheless, they may employ similar 
investment strategies and require similar skills in terms of identifying mispricing and timing the 
market, to the extent that many investment advisory firms find it appealing to offer both type of 
products. Indeed, the joint management of retail mutual funds and institutional funds is quite 
prevalent. The largest mutual fund companies in the U.S., such as Vanguard, Fidelity, Capital 
Research and Management, and T. Row Price, are also among the largest institutional fund 
managers. The size of the institutional assets they manage is often comparable to (or even 
exceeds) the size of their mutual fund assets.  
The concurrent management of retail and institutional funds suggests that various 
decisions within fund management companies -- for example, allocating managers and analysts 
to funds, sharing investment ideas, coordinating trade executions, and launching new products – 
are made with both types of funds in mind, rather than for each type alone. This aspect of the 
investment management industry has not attracted sufficient attention of academic studies.  With 
a few exceptions (discussed later), the vast research on mutual funds and the burgeoning 
literature on institutional funds typically look at the two types of funds separately.   
In this study, we examine whether there are economies of scale, or lack of it, in the joint 
management of retail and institutional funds. Economies of scale are perhaps the most important 
economic rationale for such a joint fund management phenomenon. Conceptually, investment 
firms managing both types of funds may enjoy operating synergies, such as efficient allocation 
                                                          
2  The main product form of institutional funds is separately-managed accounts, with a small proportion of 
institutional funds offered in the form of commingled funds and institutional mutual funds.  Institutional funds 
(except institutional mutual funds) are not subject to the regulation of the Investment Company Act of 1940, which 
regulates mutual funds. See a publication by the Investment Company Institute (2006) for a detailed comparison of 
these two types of funds. By some tally, institutional funds have $6 trillion to $7 trillion assets under management, 
which is about half of the size of the mutual fund industry, and more than twice the size of the hedge fund industry. 
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of investment talents, and cost savings in shared accounting, client service, and other back-office 
functions. For fund investors, perhaps the most relevant synergies for fund investors are those 
directly affecting fund performance. However, based on what we know from existing studies that 
are discussed below, synergy gains for fund performance are not to be taken for granted. It is 
well-observed that the investment management industry suffers from decreasing return to scale. 
Further, managing products that cater to different clienteles may create incentive problems on the 
part of fund managers. It is unclear, but important to find out, whether the joint management of 
retail and institutional funds is good news or bad news for fund performance.  
The decreasing return to scale in the mutual fund industry has been well documented by 
existing studies; see, e.g., the pioneering study by Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) and 
subsequent studies by Yan (2008) and Pollet and Wilson (2008). These studies show that fund 
performance is negatively associated with fund size, and link this relation to illiquidity and 
organizational diseconomies. The negative relation between fund size and performance has also 
been documented for the hedge fund industry; see, e.g., Naik, Ramadorai, and Stromqvist (2007), 
Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2007), and Zhong (2008), Teo (2009), Getmansky (2012), 
and Yin (2016). By an interesting contrast, economies of scale, if any, are only visible at the fund 
family level – notably, Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) report a positive relation between 
mutual fund performance and the total mutual fund assets managed by the fund company. On an 
ex ante basis, it is unclear whether joint management of retail and institutional funds leads to 
exacerbated decreasing return to scale (due to combined size of retail and institutional products 
being similarly managed)  that resembles the individual fund size effect, or has a positive impact 
on fund performance that resembles the family size effect. Further complicating the matter, the 
pervasiveness of this positive family size effect is questioned recently by Yin (2016). He finds 
that in the hedge fund industry, the relation between fund performance and family size is 
negative. 
Conflicts of interest may arise whenever the same fund manager or the same investment 
firm serves two different types of clients (retail and institutional). In particular, because payoffs 
received from different clients are different, the investment firm may allocate efforts and 
resources discriminatively to favor one type of clients over another. Several studies, including 
Chen and Chen (2009), Nohel, Wang, Zheng (2010), Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi (2010), 
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Guercio, Genҫ, and Tran (2016), examine the performance consequence of conflicts of interest in 
side-by-side management of mutual funds and hedge funds, with somewhat mixed conclusions.3 
One may argue that conflicts of interest are less acute when a mutual fund firm manages 
institutional funds, relative to the case of a mutual fund firm manages hedge funds, because fees 
collected by hedge funds are much more sensitive to performance relative to those by mutual 
funds, while the assets-based fee structures of institutional funds and mutual funds are more 
homogenous. Nevertheless, retail and institutional funds differ in investor sophistication, 
sensitivities of flows to fund performance, levels of assets-based fees, as well as regulations on 
disclosure and investor protection.  Thus conflicts of interest remain a valid concern in the 
context of our study. Interestingly, the existing studies have reached mixed conclusions 
regarding whether simultaneous management of hedge funds hurts the performance of mutual 
funds. 4 Thus, this issue is far from settled in the literature.  
We examine the implications of joint management of retail and institutional money on 
investment performance, for both retail and institutional funds, and at individual fund level as 
well as at the family level. To do so, we combine data on mutual funds from CRSP with data on 
institutional funds from a newly available source, eVestment Alliance, and then manually 
identify investment firms that jointly manage mutual funds and institutional funds. Our sample 
includes actively managed mutual funds and institutional funds that primarily invest in U.S. 
stocks, during the period of 2001-2015. Below, we describe several key findings of the paper and 
discuss their implications.  
First, we show that, within the mutual fund segment and within the institutional fund 
segment, fund performance is negatively associated with individual fund size while positively 
associated with fund family size. Our findings for mutual funds confirm those documented in 
                                                          
3 These studies do not examine the issue of economies of scale, because the hedge funds assets managed by mutual 
fund companies are typically much smaller than their mutual fund assets, making economies of scale less of a 
concern. 
4 Cici et al. (2010) find that mutual fund performance suffers when fund companies also manage hedge funds. Nohel 
et al. (2010), however, find that fund managers deliver superior mutual fund performance when they also manage 
hedge funds. They point out that this finding is consistent with fund management companies using hedge funds to 
retain talented managers. Chen and Chen (2009) separate the case where a hedge fund manager starts the 
management of a mutual fund from the case where a mutual fund manager starts to manage a hedge fund.  They find 
conflicts of interest in the former case but not the latter. Finally, based on SEC filings, Guercio, Genҫ, and Tran 
(2016) identify a more complete sample of side-by-side managed mutual funds and hedge funds for recent years, 
and find that such side-by-side arrangements hurt mutual fund performance.  
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existing studies (e.g., Chen et al. 2004) that there are diseconomies of scale at individual fund 
level and economies of scale at fund family level. Our new findings regarding institutional funds 
suggest that the scale economics for institutional funds is quite similar to that for mutual funds, 
but different from hedge funds, which exhibit decreasing returns to scale even at the fund family 
level (Yin 2016). We conduct analysis using panel regressions. Inferred from regression 
coefficients, the negative impact of fund size on performance for institutional funds is similar in 
magnitude to that for mutual funds, while the positive effect of family size on performance for 
institutional funds is smaller in magnitude to that for mutual funds.    
More importantly, we document a significant spillover effect of family size. Specifically, 
we find that mutual fund performance is positively related to the total institutional fund assets 
managed by the same firms, and institutional fund performance is positively related to the total 
mutual fund assets managed by the same firms. Not only are such spillovers mutual, judged by 
regression coefficients the spillover effects for mutual funds and for institutional funds are at 
about the same magnitude. This essentially says that the performance of both types of funds gets 
a boost by from large amount of combined assets managed by the same firm. Therefore, 
economies of scale work at the whole firm level, which are possibly driven by the operating 
synergies, e.g., efficient deployment of investment talents and other limited resources between 
mutual funds and institutional funds. 5  As a further implication, by ignoring the prevalent 
phenomenon of joint management of mutual funds and institutional funds, previous studies may 
have underestimated the magnitude of economies of scale in the investment management 
industry.  
Interestingly, while we detect significant spillover of the family size effect, there is no 
significant evidence for spillover of the fund size effect. To assess spillover at the fund level, we 
identify mutual funds and institutional funds that are managed by the same firms and belong to 
the same investment style. We find that the relation between institutional (mutual) fund 
performance and the size of same-style mutual (institutional) funds is insignificantly negative. 
That is, there is no substantial performance loss to a fund when the firm manages large amount 
of assets in a similar investment style but in the form of a different fund type. Chen et al. (2004) 
                                                          
5 Note that the spillover of family size effect only captures the synergies from allocating resources that directly 
impact performance.  Operating synergies in the form of cost savings from administrative and back office functions 
do not directly affect fund performance. Such synergies cannot be detected by our performance analysis. 
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observe that illiquidity and organizational diseconomies impose capacity constraints on funds 
and are behind the negative fund size effect. Our findings likely indicate that fund companies 
may have been able to alleviate the capacity constraints when they jointly manage retail and 
institutional funds with similar investment styles. For example, they may assign different 
managers to the same-style mutual funds and institutional funds to ensure they generate 
sufficiently diverse investment ideas, and carefully coordinate the trades from the two types of 
funds.    
Further, we find that the spillover benefits of the family size effect are distributed 
unevenly across individual funds. Within mutual funds, those with the large size or belong to the 
investment style with the largest amount of assets benefit more in performance than others from 
the institutional family size of the same firm. Within institutional funds, those with high expense 
ratios benefit more in performance than others from the mutual fund family size of the same firm. 
Note that large funds and high-expense ratio funds are perceived of higher value to the fund 
management companies (e.g., Gasper, Massa, and Matos, 2006). Thus, a possible interpretation 
of this finding is that large investment firms deploy firm-wide resources in a way that 
disproportionally benefit high-value funds.  
Finally, despite the evidence for the existence of economies of scale in the joint 
management of mutual and institutional funds, we question whether at the same time conflicts of 
interest also significantly affect performance in the context of jointly managed funds. To detect 
all forms of conflicts of interest is challenging and perhaps unrealistic. Here, we limit our 
examination to the analysis of significant performance transfer, following the analysis in existing 
studies on the joint management of mutual funds and hedge funds (e.g., Nohel et al. 2010; Cici, 
et al. 2010). We find that, relative to their independently managed counterparts, jointly managed 
mutual funds and institutional funds on average perform at least no worse; and in some cases, 
they perform substantially better. Thus, if there is any performance transfer between mutual and 
institutional funds, the magnitude is not strong enough as to cause detectable performance 
deterioration on the part of either type of funds.  This is consistent with the notion that due to 
similar fee structure, investment firms face similar incentives for fund performance for the two 
types of funds, creating no urge for performance transfer.   
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Overall, the evidence gathered from our study shows that economies of scale at 
investment firm level do exist when such investment firms manage both retail mutual funds and 
institutional funds. By managing large amount of assets, such investment firms enjoy a scale 
advantage – they have more sources and can allocate limited resources more efficiently, and they 
may be able to attract and retain talented investment managers and analysts. This offers a 
rationale for the prevalence of the joint management practice. We also find that certain funds, 
especially those of high value to the investment firms, benefit more from economies of scale, 
suggestively of uneven allocation of firm-wide resources by investment firms. However, we do 
not detect substantial performance transfer between mutual funds and institutional funds when 
they are jointly managed. This indicates that fund performance has not yet suffered substantially 
from conflicts of interest, if any, arising from the joint management practice.   
In Section II we provide a detailed review of related literature. Here, we provide a 
focused discussion on two studies that explicitly take into account the joint management of 
mutual funds and institutional funds, and therefore are most related to ours. First, Evans and 
Fahlenbrach (2012) examine the performance of a subset of retail mutual funds that offer a 
separate version of the fund for institutional investors in either mutual fund or separate account 
form, but where the same managers follow virtually the same strategy for both the retail and 
institutional assets. They find that retail mutual funds with institutional twins perform better than 
retail funds without. They attribute this performance difference to the spillover effect of investor 
governance; that is, retail fund investors benefit from the monitoring efforts by sophisticated 
institutional investors on fund performance. Second, based on SEC filings by fund companies, 
Guercio, Genҫ, and Tran (2016) examine the case where mutual fund managers simultaneously 
manage either hedge funds or institutional funds. They find that mutual fund performance suffers 
when mutual fund managers are also involved in the management of hedge funds, but no 
significant performance impact when mutual fund managers are involved in managing 
institutional funds, regardless of whether institutional funds charge performance-based fees or 
not.   
There are two key differences between the above two studies and ours. First, the above 
two studies are interested in the incentive and governance problems, but do not say anything 
about the issue of interest in our study, (dis)economies of scale. Second, these studies do not 
have data on the performance of institutional funds, and instead focus on the performance of 
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mutual funds. By contrast, we are able to combine data on both mutual funds and institutional 
funds, and analyze the performance consequence on both mutual funds and institutional funds. 
Being able to tell the stories of both sides is particularly important for assessing economies of 
scale.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a literature review. 
Section III discusses the data and sample. Section IV reports empirical results. Section V 
concludes. 
 
II. Related Literature 
Relative to the large literature on mutual funds, there has been relatively sparse research 
on the institutional funds. The following papers, to our knowledge, delineate the main landscape 
of academic research on institutional funds in the U.S. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) examine 
562 pension fund managers and find that institutional clients consider excess fund return rather 
than raw return in deciding capital allocation. They also report that institutional flows respond 
sensitively to both good and poor past performance. Goyal and Wahal (2008) focus on plan 
sponsors’ hiring and firing decisions of institutional investment managers, and find evidence of 
return chasing, especially for hiring decision, but they do not examine the general flow pattern. 
In terms of performance and persistence, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) show that 
conflicts of interests prevent (341) institutional funds from adding value to end investors. James 
and Karceski (2006) report that institutional mutual funds with low initial investment 
requirements and those with retail mates perform significantly worse than other institutional 
mutual funds. They attribute their findings to the effect of investor monitoring. Busse, Goyal and 
Wahal (2010) also find little evidence of performance persistence for institutional funds. 
Recently, Chaudhuri, Ivkovic, and Trzcinka (2013) report evidence that institutional investment 
management firms strategically allocate performance across various funds they manage, in a way 
to maximize the benefit to the management firms themselves. Chaudhuri, Ivkovic, Pollet, and 
Trzcinka (2013) report that Ph.D. degrees earned by fund managers are a positive indicator of 
institutional fund performance. Finally, Jenkinson, Jones, and Martinez (2016) study the role of 
investment consultants in advising institutional clients and find that consultants’ 
recommendations negatively predict institutional fund performance. These studies, however, do 
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not focus on the key issue we are interested in, i.e., economies of scale in the joint management 
of retail and institutional funds.  
By comparison, many studies have analyzed the (dis)economies of scale in the mutual 
fund industry. Diminishing return to scale features prominently as an assumption in the theories 
offered to explain various phenomena in the mutual fund industry; see, e.g., Berk and Green 
(2004), and Pastor and Stambaugh (2012). It is well observed that when a mutual fund grows 
larger, it becomes more difficult for the fund to identify worthwhile investment opportunities and 
its trading costs increase. On the other hand, large fund management firms may have more 
research resources, more dedicated trading desks, and potentially more efficient operations due 
to organizational advantages in terms of marketing and distributions.  
Evidence on diseconomies of scale in the mutual fund industry has been widely reported. 
Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) represent the seminal work on this issue. They further 
hypothesize that the result is driven by liquidity and its interaction with organizational 
diseconomy, and provide empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Subsequent studies 
including Yan (2008) and Pollet and Wilson (2008) report evidence consistent with the 
diseconomy of scale for mutual funds and further investigate the causes of the diseconomy of 
scale. Yan show that the negative relation between fund size and performance is stronger among 
funds holding less liquid portfolios as well as funds demanding more intermediacy for trading 
(e.g., growth funds and high turn-over funds). Pollet and Wilson (2008) find that when fund size 
grows, funds are reluctant to increase the number of positions, and only those few with better 
investment ideas do so. Thus lack of new investment ideas combined with the price impact of 
large positions exacerbates the role of liquidity in driving the relation between fund size and 
performance. Recently, Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2013) examine the implication of 
changing stock selection skills among fund managers in the inference on diseconomy of scale. 
They detect decreasing return to scale at the fund industry level but not at individual fund level. 
They argue that the emergence of new funds with stock selection skills complicates the detection 
of decreasing return to scale at individual fund level. Reuters and Zitzewitz (2015) focus on the 
fund size change due to large fund flows induced Morningstar fund rating changes and find that 
such fund size change is not related to subsequent fund performance.  
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Chen et al. (2004) also report that fund family size is positively related to fund 
performance, suggesting economy of scale at the fund family level. They conjecture, albeit 
without empirical investigation, that this effect is driven by large fund families’ advantages in 
marketing and in trading. Pollet and Wilson (2008) offer an additional explanation based on 
large fund families’ advantage in research; they find that fund family growth is typically related 
to  introduction of new funds with relatively low portfolio overlaps with existing funds. Thus 
fund families appear to be able to take advantage of new investment ideas as they grow.  
  There are also quite extensive studies on the decreasing return to scale, or capacity 
constraints, in the hedge fund industry; see, e.g., Naik, Ramadorai, and Stromqvist (2007), Fung, 
Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2007), Zhong (2008), Teo (2009), Getmansky (2012), and Yin 
(2016). Interestingly, Yin (2012) documents that in the hedge fund industry, fund family size 
negatively impacts hedge fund performance. Thus, there are diseconomies of scale for hedge 
funds, even at the fund family level. 
 The implications on the joint management of mutual funds and hedge funds are the 
subject of analysis by Chen and Chen (2009), Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi (2010), Nohel, Wang, 
and Zheng (2010), and Guercio, Genҫ, and Tran (2016). Relative to mutual funds, hedge funds 
offer more attractive fee revenues to fund advisors. A typical hedge fund advisor charges 2% flat 
fees based on assets under management, plus 20% performance-based fee. By contrast, a typical 
equity mutual fund advisor charges 1% flat-fees on assets under management. Thus, fund 
advisors may have incentives to devote more resources and efforts to the management of the 
more lucrative hedge fund business, away from the mutual fund business. Cici et al. examine the 
performance of mutual funds when the fund companies also manage hedge funds. They focus on 
the conflicts of incentives offered by hedge funds vs. mutual funds. Consistent with the idea that 
fund companies divert resources and efforts to the more lucrative hedge fund business, they find 
that mutual fund performance tends to suffer when hedge funds are jointly managed by the same 
advisory firms. This conclusion is not without debate though. In comparison, Nohel et al. point 
out that fund companies often use hedge fund business as a way to retain star mutual fund 
managers. By looking at the cases where an individual fund manager jointly manages mutual 
funds and hedge funds, their sample selection is also different from that of Cici et al. Consistent 
with their hypothesis, they find that in the cases of side-by-side management, mutual funds 
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generate superior performance, while hedge funds do not outperform peers. Similar to Nohel et 
al. (2010), Chen and Chen (2009) also look at the cases of individual managers concurrently 
managing mutual funds and hedge funds. However, they separate the case where a hedge fund 
manager starts the management of a mutual fund from the case where a mutual fund manager 
starts to manage a hedge fund.  They find conflicts of interest in the former case but not the latter. 
Finally, based on SEC filings on disclosure of performance-based fees, Guercio, Genҫ, and Tran 
(2016) find that side-by-side management of mutual funds and hedge funds hurts mutual fund 
performance. 
Finally, existing studies have examined incentive issues within the family of mutual 
funds managed by the same advisory firms. Prominently, Gasper, Massa, and Matos (2006) find 
that funds with important “family values”, i.e., those with high fees or high past performance, 
outperform at the expense of “low family value” funds. Further, “high-value” funds receive 
favorable treatment by the fund families—they receive more allocations of underpriced IPO 
shares, and are at the better side of transactions when they have trades in the opposite direction 
of trades made by other funds in the same families. Chaudhuri, Ivkovic, and Trzcinka (2013) 
report strategic performance transfer within institutional fund families. However, no academic 
research has examined differential treatment of institutional funds and mutual funds under the 
same advisory firms. 
 
III. Data and Sample 
III.1  Data 
Our data mainly come from two sources. Data on mutual funds are from CRSP, i.e., the 
CRSP Survivorship Free Mutual Fund Database. The CRSP database reports mutual fund returns 
and fund characteristics at the level of each fund share classes. By contrast, institutional funds do 
not have share classes. To facilitate comparison, we combine multiple share classes of the same 
mutual fund into a single fund, by taking the weighted averages overfund returns and 
characteristics, using the TNAs of share classes as weights.   
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Data on institutional funds are from a relatively new source: eVestment Alliance. Below 
we provide details about the eVestment data. 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 requires mutual funds to price their shares and 
disclose performance to fund investors on a daily basis. By contrast, there is no such reporting 
requirement for institutional funds in general. In fact, the disclosure practice of institutional 
funds (other than institutional mutual funds) is quite similar to that of hedge funds. In order to 
attract investments, institutional funds voluntarily provide periodical performance data to 
investment consultants and certain commercial data vendors. This has been the main sources of 
data on this industry. 
A few existing studies on the institutional fund industry use data from investment 
consultants. For example, Lakonishok et al. (1992) use the data provided by the consultant SEI. 
Data used by both Coggin et al. (1993) and Christopherson et al. (1998) are from Frank Russell. 
Ferson and Khang (2002) use data from Callan Associates. Goyal and Wahal (2008) use data 
from Mercer. And the U.K data used by Blake et al. (2013) are from the consultant subsidiary of 
BNY Mellon. As pointed out by Lakonishok et al. (1992), investment consultants often only 
have data on funds that their clients invest in or may potentially invest in, and thus may be 
subject to potential selection biases. The data collected by consultants in early periods are 
typically not survivorship bias free. 
A few commercial vendors have attempted to gather more complete coverage of this 
industry, and have made their data available to consultants, plan sponsors, investment managers, 
as well as researchers. The early data vendors include Plan Sponsors Network (PSN) and the 
Mobius Group; both later acquired by Informa Investment Solutiuons (IIS) (in 1998 and 2006 
respectively). Currently, IIS and eVestment Alliance are the two main commercial data vendors 
on institutional fund data. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) use data from Mobius, Busse et al. (2010) 
use data from IIS, and Jenkinson et al. (2016) use the eVestment data, respectively. There are 
similar quality issues on data collected by these vendors during early periods. However, data 
quality has improved over time. For example, Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) note that the Mobius 
data they use are subject to the survivorship bias. By contrast, Busse et al. (2010) note that the 
data from IIS (the successor to Mobius) are free from the survivorship bias. 
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 Based on our conversations with data vendors, the differences between the IIS data and 
the eVestment data are mainly in terms of their coverage for early years and for international 
advisory firms. IIS has better fund coverage for early periods, while eVestment has better 
coverage for institutional fund managers outside the U.S.. In terms of U.S. domestic institutional 
funds, since the 2000s, the coverage by eVestment is comparable to that of IIS and both are free 
of the survivorship bias. In addition, the eVestment data have more information on the 
management firm characteristics and fund characteristics, which are important to our study. 
For the above considerations, we choose eVestment as our main data source for 
institutional funds. The information provided by eVestment include quarterly assets under 
management, monthly (as well as quarterly and annual) returns, fee scheme, investment 
approach, the profile of investment advisory firms, as well as information about the investment 
accounts that reveal the characteristics of investment clients. The sample in our study is the 
actively-managed institutional funds that are domiciled in U.S. and mainly invest in domestic 
equities, for the period from 1998 to 2014. Even though data for earlier years are available, we 
focus on this relatively recent period to alleviate data quality issues discussed above. 
The eVestment data deal with the survivorship issue in the following way. If a fund stops 
reporting to the database at a certain time point, the fund is classified as “inactive”. The database 
provides the date on which a fund becomes inactive, and keeps all the historical data prior to the 
inactive date. Note that survivorship is not the only known issue for self-reported performance 
data. To alleviate the incubation bias (e.g., Evans 2010), we only include fund performance 
observations after a portfolio’s inception date and exclude funds with assets under management 
below $25 million (as funds in incubation typically are small). To address the back-filling bias, 
we require at least 24 months of prior performance data for a fund to be included in analysis. 
We proceed to discuss a few unique reporting conventions in the institutional fund 
industry to help understand the way we process the data. Although collectively referred to as 
``institutional funds" in our study, delegated investment portfolios catering to plan sponsors 
actually take several forms, ranging from separately managed accounts, commingled funds, to 
the institutional version of mutual funds. For this reason, the institutional funds are termed 
“products” in the database. Each product consists of a number of investor accounts. As noted by 
Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) and Busse et al. (2010), because separate-account clients can 
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request various portfolio restrictions or adjustments, accounts under the same product can have 
slightly different portfolio compositions even though they are managed by the same manager 
using the same strategy. This creates complications in performance reporting. 
The fund returns reported in the database are “composite returns”. They are returns net of 
trading costs but gross of management fees, on “composite portfolios”, i.e., combined holdings 
from various representative investment accounts of the same product. Similar to the practice in 
the mutual fund industry, fees charged on an institutional account are typically a flat percentage 
of the account size.6 The percentage fees typically decline when the account size exceeds certain 
breakpoints, e.g., $10 million, $50 million, and $100 million. Therefore, the after-fee returns of 
individual accounts under the same product can be different due to both difference in portfolio 
compositions and difference in fees. 
We calculate the average expense ratio of an institutional portfolio based on the fee for 
the average account size of the main product form of the portfolio. For example, if the main 
product form is separate account, and the average separate account size is $15m, then we take the 
expense ratio set for accounts with size between $10m and $50m.  
We measure net fund return, or after-expense fund return, as the reported composite 
return minus the average expense ratio. The return calculated this way represents the experience 
of an investor with an average-sized account of that portfolio. We have alternatively calculated 
returns based on the maximum or minimum percentage fee. We have also performed analysis by 
only including return records where the composite portfolio represents a very high fraction of the 
entire portfolio (following Del Guercio and Tkac 2002). The analyses based on such alternative 
fee assumptions and composition restrictions do not result in any significant departure from our 
conclusions. For brevity we do not tabulate the results of such alternative analysis in the paper. 
  Further, for both mutual funds and institutional funds, we measure abnormal fund 
performance by the style-adjusted net return of a fund. The net returns of mutual funds are 
                                                          
6 eVestment and IIS do not report the performance-based fees in their datasets. Performance-based fees were rare for 
institutional products in the early sample period but are more often observed in recent years. Based on our inquiry 
with a large institutional investment management firm, between 10% and 20% of the accounts it manages have 
performance fees now. However, the amount of fees tied to performance is much smaller than that tied to account 
size (even for their top-performing products). Further, performance-based fees charged by institutional funds are at a 
much smaller percentage relative to those charged by hedge funds.  
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directly reported in CRSP. As explained above, the net returns of institutional funds are the 
reported composite returns minus the average expense ratio. All funds are then classified into 
one of twelve investment styles. The investment styles are based on the marketcap and value 
dimeions, including Allcap Core, Allcap Growth, Allcap Value, Largecap Core, Largecap 
Growth, Largecap Value, Midcap Core, Midcap Growth, Midcap Value, Smallcap Core, 
Smallcap Growth, and Smallcap Value. In the CRSP data, we follow the Lipper investment 
objective code to classify investment styles, and map Lipper investment objectives into the above 
12 styles. In eVestment, we follow the investment universe classification provided in the data 
and map them into the above 12 styles. The details of investment style mapping are provided in 
the Appendix of the paper.  
 Once we obtain the style classifications of each mutual fund and institutional fund, we 
calculate a monthly benchmark return for each style, separately for mutual funds and institutional 
funds. The style benchmark return is the average monthly net return of all funds in that style. 
Then, we measure abnormal monthly performance of a fund -- denoted as PERF in the rest of the 
paper -- as the monthly net return minus the benchmark return for the style the fund belongs to. 
This procedure is done separately for mutual funds and for institutional funds. 
In Table 1, we provide the details of all the variables employed in our analysis, including 
the style-adjusted fund performance measure, fund size, fund family size, etc..  
 
III.2  Identifying Joint Management of Mutual Funds and Institutional Funds 
Given our purpose of studying economics of scale for actively managed equity portfolios, 
we begin with all investment firms managing active US equity mutual funds from the CRSP data, 
and all investment firms managing active US equity institutional funds from the eVestment data. 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2014.  
To identify advisory firms that concurrently manage mutual funds and institutional funds, 
we match the names of investment firms in the eVestment data with the names of investment 
firms in the CRSP data. We use an algorithm to match the firm names first. The algorithm takes 
into account patterns of variations and abbreviations in firm names in the two databases (e.g., 
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one database using the abbreviation “mgmt” while another using “management” in a firm’s 
name). We then manually verify the matched names, and perform additional manual matching 
among the remaining firms that the algorithm fails to identify initially. 
Having identified investment firms that manage both mutual funds and institutional funds, 
we then identify, within each firm, specific institutional funds and mutual funds that have the 
same investment styles. When funds of the same investment firm have the same investment style, 
they likely have substantial overlaps in stock holdings and trades. Thus they may suffer from 
diseconomies of scale jointly as if they were a single fund. Following Cici et al. (2010) and 
Nohel et al. (2010), we refer to these matched funds as “side-by-side managed” (SBS) funds. We 
use two methods to identify such SBS funds. First, we use fund investment styles reported in 
both eVestment and CRSP to perform such matching. Second, we use the return regression to 
estimate the factor exposures of a fund and determine the investment styles by the estimated 
factor exposures.  
 
III.3 Additional Data Details 
  Before going into the summary statistics of the sample and the empirical results, below 
we discuss three additional pieces of data details,  
III.3.1  Institutional Mutual Funds 
First, mutual funds and institutional funds are not mutually exclusive concepts. 
Institutional mutual funds or the institutional share classes of mutual funds, are both mutual 
funds and institutional funds, and they show up in both CRSP and eVestment. When we 
construct the samples, an issue we have to deal with is how to classify these funds – whether to 
include into the mutual fund sample or the institutional fund sample.  
It turns out that the aggregate assets of these funds or share classes are relatively small, 
compared with either the aggregate size of retail mutual funds or the aggregate size of 
institutional funds. Therefore, we find that the conclusions are not sensitive to how these 
institutional mutual funds are classified. In our reported analysis we treat them as mutual funds 
and exclude them from the institutional fund sample. We note that if we treat them as 
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institutional funds and exclude them from the mutual fund sample, all our key results remain 
unchanged. 
III.3.2 Subsidiaries of Investment Firms 
A second issue is the treatment of subsidiaries of parent investment firms. From time to 
time, conglomerates emerge in the investment management industry. In these conglomerates, a 
large investment firms hold full ownerships or majority-ownerships of a collection of small 
investment firms. Take Legg Mason for example. While Legg Mason itself is an investment firm 
with a large mutual fund operation and a large institutional fund operation, it also owns nine 
subsidiaries that manage wide varieties of investment portfolios – Brandywine Global, Clarion 
Partners, ClearBridge Investments, EnTrustPermal, Martin Currie, QS Investors, RARE, Royce 
& Associates, and Western Asset.7 The investment decisions are made relatively independently 
by the subsidiaries, but many back-office functions are somewhat integrated at the parent firm 
level. 
In CRSP and eVestment, assets managed by these subsidiaries are reported separately 
from the assets managed directly by the parents. That is, the subsidiaries are considered separate 
investment firms or families. A question arises when studying economies of scale – should we 
aggregate the assets to the parent firm level, and consider the family size effect at such a highly 
aggregated level, or treat each subsidiary as a family and consider the family size effect at the 
subsidiary level? 
In our reported analysis, we choose to treat subsidiaries as families without aggregating 
to the parent firm level. The reason behind our choice is that investment decisions are typically 
made at the subsidiary level, and therefore, if there are any synergies in investment operations, 
most likely such synergies take place across portfolios within the same subsidiary. Because of 
lack of investment resource sharing across subsidiaries, we are less likely to see synergies across 
subsidiaries.  
III.3.3 Actively Managed Equity Assets vs All Assets 
                                                          
7 See https://www.leggmason.com/en-us/about/affiliates.html. 
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 A third issue we have to deal with is the tally of family size. Investment firms sometimes 
manage money in multiple asset classes, from equities, fixed income, to real estates and 
commodities, etc.. While synergies for back-office operations may exist across investments in 
different assets classes, the synergies for investment operations are less likely so. Conceptually, 
the performance of a stock fund may unlikely benefit from having many fixed income fund 
managers working in the same firm.8 Similarly, within the equity funds, the performance of an 
active fund may unlikely benefit from having many index equity fund managers around. 
Therefore, in all our reported analysis, we calculate family size as the total net assets of all the 
actively managed equity portfolios of a firm.  
 
III.4 Summary Statistics 
 Here we provide summary statistics on the samples of mutual funds, institutional funds, 
and the jointly managed funds. First, in Table 2, we list the largest 10 mutual fund management 
firms and the largest 10 institutional fund management firms. The largest firms are defined by 
the total active equity TNA they manage as of December 2014, the end of our sample period. A 
quick browse through the list reveals the prevalence of the joint management of mutual funds 
and institutional funds. Five of the top ten mutual fund firms also show up among the 10 largest 
institutional fund firms – Vanguard, Fidelity, T Row Price, Capital Group, and JP Morgan. 
Among the remaining 5 institutional fund firms, 2 are also well-known to have large mutual fund 
assets, even though they are not among the top 10 mutual fund firms – BlackRock, and 
Wellington Capital Management.  However, there are also dedicated institutional fund managers 
without substantial mutual fund assets, such as State Street Global Advisors, Northern Trust, and 
Mellon Capital. 
 Table 3 provides summary statistics on the entire mutual fund sample and the entire 
institutional fund sample. The statistics provided in the table include the number of firms, 
number of funds, TNAs, turnover ratio, expense ratio, and fund age. They are first obtained for 
each year (1998-204), and then averaged over years. The total net assets under management 
                                                          
8 See, for example, a Wall Street Journal report on the issues faced by stock funds managed by the fixed income 
giant PIMCO --  “PIMCO Pulls Out of Stock Strategies”, Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2015. 
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(TNA) reported in the table are for their actively managed US equity portfolios. In our sample, 
there are about 495 mutual fund management firms and 665 institutional fund management firms 
in the sample. The average TNAs managed is $7.4 billion per mutual fund management firm, and 
$8.5 billion per institutional fund management firm. These average numbers are small, as the 
sample is dominated by small management firms. When we further classify firms into quintiles 
by their assets, we see a wide dispersion in TNAs across fund families. Both the mutual fund 
firms and the institutional fund firms in their respective lowest TNA quintiles manage only $18 
million of TNAs. By contrast, the average TNA for the mutual fund firms in the top TNA 
quintile is $33 billion, and that for the top-quintile institutional fund firms is $39 billion. Note 
that even in the top quintiles, there are still close to 100 mutual fund firms and 133 institutional 
fund firms. Not all in the top quintile are considered truly large, since fund assets are typically 
concentrated among the mega 20 or 30 firms.   
 At individual fund level, the average TNA of mutual funds is $1.35 billion, also with a 
large dispersion across funds – an average TNA of $18 billion in the bottom quintile and an 
average TNA of $10 billion in the top quintile. The same pattern holds for institutional funds, 
with an overall average TNA of $2.6 billion, only $9 million for the bottom quintile and $40 
billion for the top quintile.  
 The table further reveals that the average annual expense ratio for institutional funds is 
0.7%, smaller than that of 1.3% for mutual funds. Among the top quintile funds, the average 
expense ratio of mutual funds is 1%, versus 0.6% for institutional funds.  
 Table 4 report the matched sample – firms managing both mutual funds and institutional 
funds. In each year, on average 90 matched firms are identified. These firms manage 213 mutual 
funds and 343 institutional funds. They manage a total of $4.8 billion mutual fund assets and a 
total of $17 billion institutional fund assets. The average TNA of individual mutual funds they 
manage is $964 million, and the average TNA of individual institutional fund they manage is 
$3.83 billion.  Apparently these firms are at the large end, compared with the assets distributions 
for the entire samples reported in Table 3. Relative to the entire sample of mutual funds, the 
mutual funds under joint management are larger, older, with lower turnover and lower expense 
ratio. Relative to the entire sample of institutional funds, those under joint management are also 
larger, but with similar level of expense ratio. 
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 Overall, the summary statistics reveal a pattern that large investment firms tend to offer 
both mutual funds and institutional funds. At the same time, many smaller investment firms 
specialize in one segment of the market – either retail or institutional, but not both. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 We report the empirical results in this part of the paper. We first report results on the 
analysis of (dis)economies of scale, followed by the analysis on the heterogeneity of the spillover 
effect, and an analysis on the potential performance transfer between mutual funds and 
institutional funds due to conflicts of interest. 
IV.1 Impact on Fund Performance by Fund Size and Family Size: (Dis)economies of 
Scale, and Spillovers 
We start with the most fundamental question of interest: are there economies of scale and 
diseconomies of scale, in the joint management of mutual funds and institutional funds?  
To examine this issue, we perform panel regressions. The regression specification is 
motivated by existing studies, in particular, Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), combined 
with the additional effects we are interested in – the impact of managing mutual (institutional) 
fund assets on the performance of institutional (mutual) funds. In other words, the regressions 
look at the performance impact of fund size, the size of the side-by-side fund--i.e., the mutual 
(institutional) fund that has the same investment style as the institutional (mutual) fund of 
interest, the size of all mutual funds the firm manages, and the size of mutual funds and 
institutional funds the advisory firm manages. 
Specifically, the baseline panel regression specification is the following: 
PERFi,t = c0 + c1*LogTNAi,t-1 +  c2*LogMutualFamTNAi,t-1  + c3*LogInstFamTNAi,t-1  
    + CONTROLS + ei,t                          (1)                                                 
where the dependent variable PERF is the abnormal fund performance measure, described in 
Section III.3 – that is, abnormal fund performance is measured by the monthly style-adjusted 
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fund net returns, i.e., fund net returns in excess of the style benchmark returns. The style 
benchmark is the average net returns to funds in the same investment style.  
The explanatory variables are the following. LogTNA is the log total net assets of the 
fund. LogMutualFamTNA is the log total net assets of all mutual funds the advisory firm 
manages. LogInstFamTNA is the log total net assets of all institutional funds the advisory firm 
manages. Finally, CONTROLS include the following set of control variables. For the mutual 
fund sample, we include the lagged fund performance (LAGPERF), fund turnover 
(TURNOVER), fund age (AGE), fund expense ratio (EXP). For institutional funds, we include 
the lagged fund performance (LAGPERF), and fund expense ratio (EXP). The panel regressions 
also include style-fixed effects and year-fixed effects. The standard errors of the regressions are 
double-clustered by fund and by year. The regression is run separately for mutual funds and 
institutional funds. 
The dependent variable, style-adjusted fund net return, is measured at the monthly 
frequency. The explanatory variables are available at various different frequencies – monthly for 
LAGPERF, quarterly for LogTNA, LogMutualFamTNA, LogInstFamTNA, and annually for 
AGE, EXP, and TURNOVER. In the regression, we use the most recently available data for the 
explanatory variables prior to month t, the month of reported fund performance (i.e., the 
dependent variable).  
If there are diseconomies of scale at fund level and economies of scale at fund family 
level, then we expect the coefficient for LogTNA to be negative and that for 
LogMutualFamTNA for the mutual fund sample and LogInstFamTNA for the institutional fund 
sample to be positive. In addition, if there is spillover of the economies of scale across fund types, 
we expect the coefficient for LogMutualFamTNA for the institutional fund sample to be positive, 
and LogInstFamTNA for the mutual fund sample to be positive. 
The results of the regressions are reported in Table 5. First, look at the impact of fund 
size per se on fund performance. For both mutual funds and institutional funds, the coefficient on 
LogTNA is significantly negative: -0.0003 for mutual funds, with a t-statistic of -7.68 (based on 
double-clustered standard errors, same below), and -0.0002 for institutional funds, with a t-
statistic of -14.19. Thus, for both mutual funds and institutional funds, there are diseconomies of 
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scale at the individual fund level. As discussed earlier, such an effect is already well-known for 
mutual funds. However it is not reported before for the institutional funds. Perhaps the result is 
not surprising, as the investment operations of mutual funds and institutional funds are similar in 
nature and thus both suffer from decreasing return to scale. Judged by the coefficients, the 
magnitude of this effect for institutional funds is similar to that of mutual funds. Further, the 
economic significance if the individual fund size effect can be assessed this way. As reported in 
the summary statistics (Table 2), the standard deviation of LogTNA is 2.02 for mutual funds, and 
2.32 for institutional funds. Thus, for mutual funds, one standard deviation increase in LogTNA 
causes a performance loss of about 6 basis points (0.06%) per month, or 72 basis points (0.72%) 
per year. For institutional funds, one standard deviation increase in LogTNA causes a 
performance loss of about 4.64 basis points (0.0464%) per month, or 56 basis points (0.56%) per 
year. Both estimates are quite sizable economically, and similar in magnitude.  
Further, look at the impact of fund family size on fund performance. Again, for both 
mutual funds and institutional funds, the coefficients on the respective family size measures – 
LogMutualFamTNA for mutual funds, and LogInstFamTNA for institutional funds -- are 
significantly positive: 0.00017 for mutual funds, with a t-statistic of 6.37, and 0.000093 for 
institutional funds, with a t-statistic of 2.53. Thus, for both mutual funds and institutional funds, 
there are economies of scale at the fund family level. As reported in the summary statistics 
(Table 3), the standard deviation of LogMutualFamTNA is 2.58, and that for LogInstFamTNA is 
2.51. Thus, for mutual funds, one standard deviation increase in LogMutualFamTNA causes a 
performance gain of about 4.4 basis points (0.044%) per month, or 53 basis points (0.53%) per 
year. For institutional funds, one standard deviation increase in LogInstFamTNA causes a 
performance gain of about 2.3 basis points (0.023%) per month, or 28 basis points (0.28%) per 
year. In this sense, the family size effect for institutional funds is about half of the magnitude 
relative to that for mutual funds.  
More importantly, look at the spillover effect of family size. The coefficient for 
LogInstFamTNA is significantly positive for the mutual fund regression, at 0.000052, with a t-
statistic of 3.65. And the coefficient for LogMutualFamTNA is significantly positive for the 
institutional fund regression, at 0.000031, with a t-statistic of 2.53. The spillover coefficients for 
mutual funds and institutional funds are at about the same magnitude. These results suggest the 
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existence of spillover of the family size effect – mutual fund performance benefits from the large 
institutional assets managed by the same firm, and institutional fund performance benefits from 
the large mutual fund assets managed by the same firm. The economic significance of the results 
can be again assessed by taking into account the cross-sectional standard deviations of 
LogMutualFamTNA and LogInstFamTNA reported in Table 3. For mutual funds, one standard 
deviation increase in LogInstFamTNA causes a performance gain of about 1.3 basis points 
(0.013%) per month, or 16 basis points (0.16%) per year. For institutional funds, one standard 
deviation increase in LogMutualFamTNA causes a performance gain of about 0.78 basis points 
(0.0078%) per month, or 9.4 basis points (0.094%) per year. In this sense, the economic impact 
of the spillover for institutional funds is about a little more than half of the magnitude of that for 
mutual funds. 
We also compare the spillover of the family size effect with the family size effect per se. 
The economic significance discussed in the above suggests that the spillover effect is about one 
third of the magnitude of the family size effect per se, for both mutual funds and institutional 
funds. Thus, the spillover effect should not be lightly dismissed.  
In addition to these main variables of interest, the regression results show that for both 
mutual funds and institutional funds, there is performance persistence – the coefficient for 
LAGPERF is significantly positive. Further, for mutual funds, expense ratio and turnover both 
have a significantly negative impact on fund performance, while the impact of fund age is 
significantly positive. For institutional funds, the impact of expense ratio on fund performance is 
negative but statistically insignificant.   
Overall, the analysis reported in Table 5 provides evidence for 1) decreasing return to 
fund size at individual fund level, 2) economies of scale at fund family level, and 3) a positive 
spillover impact of institutional fund family size on mutual fund performance, as well as a 
positive spillover impact of mutual fund family size on institutional fund performance. The 
evidence suggests existence of economies of scale at the entire investment firm level, rather than 
separately for retail funds or institutional funds. The significance of the spillover effect further 
suggests that by ignoring the prevalent phenomenon of joint management of mutual funds and 
institutional funds, previous studies may have underestimated the magnitude of economies of 
scale in the investment management industry.  
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IV.2 Spillover of Fund Size Effect  
The regressions performed in Table 5 do not take into account any spillover effect of 
individual fund size -- that is, whether the size of institutional fund affects the performance of a 
mutual fund in the same investment style, and vice versa. A reason to hypothesize a negative 
fund size spillover effect is that when two funds are managed by the same manager using the 
same investment strategies, essentially they are just one fund, and the impact of liquidity and 
organizational diseconomies (e.g., Chen et al. 2004) apply jointly to both funds. When two funds 
are not perfectly the same, they may still suffer from the impact of liquidity and organizational 
diseconomies, albeit to a lesser extent. We examine this effect in this part of the analysis. 
The regressions we use to examine the spillover of the fund size effect are based on a 
variation of the regressions specified in Equation (1):  
PERFi,t = c0 + c1*LogTNAi,t-1 + c3*LogSBSTNAi,t-1 + c4*LogMutualFamTNAi,t-1  
+ c5*LogInstFamTNAi,t-1 + CONTROLS + ei,t                (2)                   
where the dependent variable PERF continues to be the style-adjusted monthly net returns of a 
fund. LogTNA, LogMutualFamTNA, LogInstFamTNA, and the set of control variables are the 
same as those in Equation (1). The additional explanatory variable of interest is LogSBSTNA. It 
is the log total net assets of the side-by-side (i.e. style-matched) fund. For example, in the mutual 
fund regression, LogSBSTNA is the log TNA of the institutional funds that are managed by the 
same investment firm and have the same investment style of the mutual fund in question. And in 
the institutional fund regression, LogSBSTNA is the log TNA of the mutual funds that are 
managed by the same investment firm and have the same investment style of the institutional 
fund in question. The identification of such side-by-side funds is detailed in Section III.2.  
Again, we perform panel regressions for mutual funds and institutional funds separately,  
with style-fixed effects and year-fixed effects, and the standard errors for the regression 
coefficients are double-clustered by fund and by year. If the side-by-side management of mutual 
and institutional funds of the same investment style causes diseconomies of scale, we expect the 
coefficient for LogSBSTNA to be negative. 
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The regression results are reported in Table 6. The coefficients for the key variable of 
interest, LogSBSTNA, are negative but statistically insignificant. For example, in the mutual 
fund sample, the coefficient for LogSBSTNA is -0.00004, with a t-statistic of -0.74. In the 
institutional fund sample, the coefficient for LogSBSTNA is -0.00003, with a t-statistic of -0.48. 
Thus, although the size of institutional (mutual) funds of the same investment style negatively 
affects the performance of a mutual (institutional) fund managed by the same firm, the impact is 
not significant. 
Meanwhile, the coefficients on other explanatory variables are largely consistent with 
those obtained in Table 5. 
How do we interpret the results? In analyzing the diseconomies of scale associated with 
fund size, Chen et al. (2004) point out that as a fund becomes larger, if the fund can hire more 
managers and invest in more stock ideas, there need not be a negative relation between fund size 
and performance. Oft-time a fund cannot do that, due to what they refer to as organizational 
diseconomies. Crucially, investment decisions are often based on soft information. Such soft 
information puts a large organization into a disadvantage in the effectiveness of decision making 
(Stein 2002).   However if the firm keeps managers in separate funds, and let them make their 
own investment decisions separately, decision making needs not suffer from this inefficiency.  
Although we do not perform any formal test on the above idea, we have observed that 
frequently in the data, the style-matched mutual funds and institutional funds in the same firms 
are managed by different investment managers. Stock selection activities of the mutual fund 
manager and the institutional fund manager are likely to be relatively independent in this case. 
This perhaps explains the lack of a negative fund size spillover effect between style-matched 
mutual funds and institutional funds. 
 
IV.3 Heterogeneity in the Family Spillover Effect 
 Now back to the family size spillover effect. Such an effect, as reported in Table 5, 
suggests that large investment firms may be able to deploy firm-wide resources (e.g., managers, 
analysts, and traders) better to generate investment ideas and execute trades, relative to small 
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investment firms, which are often more resource constraints and thus are not as efficient in 
allocation. But since resource allocation is at the discretion of the firm, a natural question arises 
is whether investment firms allocate resources to benefit all funds evenly, or in a way that favors 
certain funds over others.  
Investment firms’ strategic resource allocation behavior has been documented by a few 
existing studies, in the context of both mutual funds and institutional funds. For example, Gasper, 
Massa, and Matos (2006) find that mutual funds of high values to the firms, i.e., those with large 
size, high fees or high past performance, receive favorable treatments by the fund families, such 
as more allocations of underpriced IPO shares, and are at the better side of transactions when 
they have trades in the opposite direction of trades made by other funds in the same families. 
Chaudhuri, Ivkovic, and Trzcinka (2013) report strategic performance transfer within 
institutional fund families, in a way similar to what Massa et al. report for mutual funds.  
Motivated by the above studies, we conjecture that certain funds may benefit more from 
the family size spillover effect, due to discretionary firm-wide resource allocation decisions. For 
example, when a large mutual fund company launches several institutional funds, the firm may 
allocate more analysts (who previously work for mutual fund managers) to work for a high-value 
institutional fund, relative to a low-value institutional fund. To investigate this possibility, we 
perform the following regressions.  
For the mutual fund sample, the regression specification is as follows: 
PERFi,t = c0 + c1*LogTNAi,t-1 + c3*LogSBSTNAi,t-1 + c4*LogMutualFamTNAi,t-1  
+ c5*LogInstFamTNAi,t-1 + c6*HiVali,t-1 + c7*LogInstFamTNAi,t-1*HighVali,t-1  
+ CONTROLS + ei,t                   (3) 
where HiVal is a dummy indicating a fund being a high-value one to the firm. We use three fund 
characteristics to define HiVal: fund size, the size of the investment style the fund belongs to, 
and expense ratio. HiVal takes value of 1 if a mutual fund is the largest one by TNA among all 
mutual funds the firm manages, or if the total TNAs of all mutual funds of the investment style is 
the largest among all investment styles the firm manage, or if the mutual fund has the highest 
expense ratio among all mutual funds managed by the firm. 
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And for the institutional fund sample, the regression specification is: 
PERFi,t = c0 + c1*LogTNAi,t-1 + c3*LogSBSTNAi,t-1 + c4*LogMutualFamTNAi,t-1  
+ c5*LogInstFamTNAi,t-1 + c6*HiVali,t-1 + c7*LogMutualFamTNAi,t-1*HighVali,t-1  
+ CONTROLS + ei,t                    (4) 
where HiVal is similarly defined as in Equation (3), except that here it is defined for the 
institutional fund sample. 
 Again, the panel regressions are performed separately for mutual funds and institutional 
funds, with style-fixed effects and year-fixed effects, and the standard errors for the regression 
coefficients are double-clustered by fund and by year. The interaction term, 
LogInstFamTNA*HighVal for mutual funds and LogMutualFamTNA*HighVal for institutional 
funds, capture the differential spillover family size effect. If investment firms favor high value 
funds as defined by fund size, style size, and expense ratio, we expect the coefficients on these 
two interactions terms to be positive. The regression results are reported in Table 7. Panel A, B, 
and C of the table use three different definitions of HiVal, based on fund size, style size, and 
expense ratio.  
For the mutual fund sample, when HiVal is represented by the largest fund in the family, 
the coefficient for the interaction term LogInstFamTNA*HighVal is significantly positive, at 
0.00013, with a t-statistic of 2.97. This suggests that relative to other mutual funds in the family, 
the largest mutual fund enjoys extra performance boost from having large amount of institutional 
fund assets managed by the same firm.  Further, when HiVal is represented by the investment 
style with the largest amount of TNA in the family, the coefficient for the interaction term 
LogInstFamTNA*HighVal is also significantly positive, at 0.000089, with a t-statistic of 2.47. 
This suggests that relative to other mutual funds in the family, the mutual funds belonging to the 
largest investment style (likely the firm’s expertise) enjoys extra performance boost from having 
large amount of institutional fund assets managed by the same firm. Finally, when HiVal is 
represented by the mutual funds with the highest expense ratio in the family, the coefficient for 
the interaction term LogInstFamTNA*HighVal is also insignificantly positive, at 0.000029, with 
a t-statistic of 0.77. 
29 
 
For the institutional fund sample, when HiVal is represented by the largest fund in the 
family, the coefficient for the interaction term LogMutualFamTNA*HighVal is insignificantly 
positive, at 0.000029, with a t-statistic of 0.40. When HiVal is represented by the investment 
style with the largest amount of TNA in the family, the coefficient for the interaction term 
LogMutualFamTNA*HighVal is also insignificantly positive, at 0.000087, with a t-statistic of 
0.21. The above results suggest that relative to other institutional funds in the family, the ones 
with the largest TNA or belonging to the largest investment style do not significantly enjoy any 
extra performance boost from having large amount of mutual fund assets managed by the same 
firm. However, when HiVal is represented by the institutional funds with the highest expense 
ratio in the family, the coefficient for the interaction term LogMutualFamTNA*HighVal is 
significantly positive, at 0.00012, with a t-statistic of 2.95. This suggests that the high-expense 
institutional funds enjoy more performance boost from having a large amount of mutual fund 
assets managed by the investment firm.  
Combining results for the mutual fund sample and the institutional fund sample, we 
conclude that the spillover effect of family size is not distributed evenly across funds. Rather, 
certain funds benefit more from it than others. The ones receiving extra benefits tend to be the 
ones of high value to the investment firms – those with large TNA and belonging to the largest 
investment style (in the case of mutual funds) and those with high fees (in the case of 
institutional funds). Possibly, this is the outcome of intentional decisions by the investment firms. 
That is, investment firms strategically deploy firm-wide resources across mutual funds and 
institutional funds they manage, to maximize the benefit of the investment firms.  
 
IV.4 Performance Transfer Between Jointly Managed Mutual Funds and Institutional 
Funds 
 The results obtained in Table 7, showing uneven benefit of family size spillover across 
funds, smell conflicts of interest. However, this may not be the more egregious form of conflicts; 
afterall, we seldom hear outcry of unfairness if all funds benefit, except that some benefit more 
than others.   
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In the joint management of mutual funds and institutional funds, there is an even more 
direct and important form of conflicts of interest, which is between the two types of funds. For 
example, an investment management firm, responding to different incentives, may allocate 
resources away from one type of funds onto another, to the extent that mutual funds (institutional 
funds) receive a performance boost but the performance of institutional funds (mutual funds) is 
hurt by such arrangements. Such conflicts of interest are sometimes referred to as performance 
transfer and analyzed by in existing studies in a different context. For example, Nohel et al. 
(2010) and Cici et al. (2010) examine performance transfer between mutual funds and hedge 
funds managed by the same investment firms, with mixed conclusions.  
To study potential performance transfer, we follow Nohel et al. (2010) and Cici et al. 
(2010) to perform the following panel regressions: 
PERFi,t  =  c0 + c1*JOINTi,t  + c2*MAINi,t + c3*LogTNAi,t-1 + c4*LogFamTNAi,t-1  
              +  CONTROLS + ei,t                  (5) 
where the dependent variable PERF is the style-adjusted fund performance measure. JOINT is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the investment firm engages in joint management of 
retail and institutional funds, and 0 otherwise. MAIN is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if the fund belongs to the main type of funds the firm offers (e.g., a mutual fund if the majority 
of the firm’s assets is mutual fund; an institutional fund if the majority of the firm’s assets is 
institutional) and 0 otherwise. Specifically, in the mutual fund sample, if for an investment firm, 
the TNAs of its mutual funds exceed the TNAs of its institutional funds, than MAIN equals 1, 
and 0 otherwise. Similarly, in the instutitional fund sample, if for an investment firm, the TNAs 
of its intitutional funds exceed the TNAs of its mutual funds, than MAIN equals 1, and 0 
otherwise. LogFAMTNA takes the value of LogMutualFAMTNA in the mutual fund sample, 
and takes the value of LogInstFAMTNA for the institutional fund sample. Finally, CONTROLS 
refer to the same set of control variables previously defined for Equation (1).  
Note that the regression specification in (5) is quite similar to that in (1), except that the 
variable representing the family size spillover effect (LogInstFAMTNA for mutual funds and 
LogMutualFAMTNA for institutional funds) is replaced by the dummy variable JOINT. 
However, what one can infer from these two regressions is quite different. The coefficient for the 
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family size spillover variable in Equation (1) tells us about how mutual fund performance 
changes with an increase in the assets of institutional funds.  However, it does not tell as the 
average effect on mutual fund performance by having institutional assets. That average effect is 
part of the intercept in Equation (1). In Equation (5), that average effect is captured by the 
coefficient on JOINT, which are further explained below. 
If there are differential incentives in resource allocation and effort allocation that cause 
substantial performance transfer, then we expect the coefficient for JOINT to be significantly 
different from zero. Of particular interest is the case of a negative coefficient, which means that 
performance transfer results in significant negative impact on fund performance (potentially to 
benefit the other type of funds managed by the firm). For example, a negative coefficient for 
JOINT in the mutual fund sample would suggest that on average, the performance of mutual 
funds is worse when the firm jointly manage institutional funds, relative to independently 
managed mutual funds. A positive coefficient for JOINT can be interpreted in several ways. It 
may either signal that overall the type of funds studied benefits from the economies of scale, or 
indicate that this type of funds benefits from performance transfer at the cost of the other type. 
The case of negative coefficients, on the other hand, has a clear interpretation. Specifically, in 
the mutual fund sample, if the coefficient for JOINT is negative, it suggests that mutual fund 
performance is hurt by the performance transfer behavior of the investment firm (potentially 
benefiting institutional funds). And if the coefficient for JOINT is negative in the institutional 
fund sample, it suggests that the performance of institutional funds is hurt by performance 
transfer behavior of the investment firm.  
In the case of jointly managed mutual funds and hedge funds, the incentive differences 
are clear so that the natural prior is that performance transfer may hurt mutual funds at the 
benefit of hedge funds (e.g., Cici et al. 2010; Nohel et al. 2010). In the case of jointly managed 
mutual funds and institutional funds, the incentive difference is not so clear, and thus there is no 
strong prior with respect to which type of funds may be favored and which type may be hurt. 
Both mutual funds and institutional funds charge asset-based fees. A small proportion of 
institutional funds have performance fee features, but the magnitude of the performance fee is 
much smaller relative to the hedge funds. In addition, as shown in Table 2, the expense ratios of 
institutional fund on average are lower than those of mutual funds. However, due to large 
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individual account size and small number of accounts, institutional funds incur much lower client 
service costs relative to mutual funds. At the end of day, it is still unclear whether mutual funds 
or institutional funds are more profitable operations of a typical investment management. 
In addition, we introduce the dummy variable MAIN to additional test a hypothesis that 
an investment firm would favor or disfavor a type of funds depending on whether that type of 
funds represents the major assets it manages. For example, an investment manager may have 
incentives to favor mutual funds against institutional funds if mutual funds represent the majority 
of its assets. Or to the opposite, to cultivate still growing institutional funds that account for a 
small proportion of its assets, an investment firm may find it worthwhile to subsidize 
institutional funds. Based on these hypotheses, In the mutual fund sample, if the regression 
coefficient for MAIN is negative, it suggests that resources may have being siphoned away more 
from mutual funds as the major type of assets, relatively to the case where institutional funds are 
the main type of assets. On the other hand, if the regression coefficient for MAIN is positive, it 
suggests that resources may have being siphoned into mutual funds more relative to the case 
where institutional funds are the major type of assets. 
The panel regressions include style-fixed effects as well as year-fixed effects. The 
standard errors of the regressions are double-clustered by fund and by year. The regression is run 
separately for mutual funds and institutional funds. The results are reported in Table 8. 
 In the mutual fund sample, the coefficient for JOINT is significantly positive, at 0.00054, 
with a t-statistic of 3.58. This suggests that performance transfer, if any, has not substantially 
hurt the performance of mutual funds when institutional funds are jointly managed. The 
coefficient on MAIN is negative but statistically insignificant (-0.0001, with a t-statistic of -0.61). 
Thus, there is no evidence either that investment firms have extra incentive to favor mutual funds 
when they represent the major assets of the firm. 
 In the institutional fund sample, the coefficient for JOINT is 0.00047, with a t-statistic of 
1.63. Thus, on average there is no significant impact on institutional fund performance when the 
firm also manages mutual funds. The coefficient on MAIN is -0.0004, with a t-statistic of -1.36. 
Thus, there is no significant evidence either, on the hypothesis that investment firms transfer 
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resources away from the main operations of institutional funds to favor mutual funds that 
represent the minor part of its operation.  
 Overall, the evidence in this part of the analysis does not support the hypothesis that 
investment firms deploy resources between mutual funds and institutional funds in a 
substantially discriminative way, to the extent that such deployment absolutely hurts either 
mutual funds or institutional funds. Rather, the evidence suggests that due to economies of scale, 
the investment firms can deploy resources to benefit one type or both types of funds, without 
absolutely hurting either one.  
 It is also worth noting that the coefficients for other variables reported in Table 8 are 
largely consistent with those obtained in Table 5. In particular, in Table 8, the coefficients for 
fund size per se are significantly negative, while the coefficients for the fund family size are 
significantly positive, consistent with the diseconomies of scale at individual fund level and 
economics of scale at fund family level. The coefficients on lagged fund performance, fund 
expense ratio, fund age, and turnover, are also consistent with those in Table 5. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 In this study, we examine the performance consequences of the joint management of 
mutual funds and institutional funds by investment management firms. Such joint management 
practices are quite prevalent in the investment industry, especially for large investment firms.  
 We find evidence that there are economies of scale in the joint management of the two 
types of funds. The performance of a mutual fund gets a boost when its management firm also 
manages a large amount of institutional money. And the performance of an institutional fund 
gets a boost when its management firm also manages a large amount of mutual funds. 
Meanwhile, within both the mutual funds segment and the institutional fund segment, fund 
performance suffers from diseconomies of scale at individual fund level and economies of scale 
at the fund family level. Relative to the family size effect, the spillover of the family size effect 
across fund type is about a third of the magnitude. Thus, both the family size effect and the 
spillover effect are important part of the overall economies of scale.  
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  We also find that the spillover of the family size effect benefit fund performance 
unevenly. Certain funds, such as large mutual funds or mutual funds belonging to the large 
investment style of the firm, and high-expense institutional funds, benefit more relative to other 
funds. This suggests that large investment firms deploy firm-wide resources in a way to favor 
funds of higher economic values to the firms.  
Despite the possibility of such favoritism, we find no evidence that joint management of 
the two types of funds hurts the performance of either the mutual funds or the institutional funds 
jointly managed. Thus, economies of scale, rather than conflicts of interest, are the dominant 
driver of investment firms’ practice of jointly managing mutual funds and institutional funds. 
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Appendix. Mapping of eVestment investment universe codes and Lipper investment objective codes 
into investment styles 
 
Panel A. Mapping of eVestment codes for institutional funds into the 12 investment styles 
 
Style no.  Style Name Universe ID Universe Name 
1 All Cap Core 1105 eA US Enhanced Equity 
  
1134 eA US All Cap Equity 
  
1158 eA All US Equity 
  
45611 eA SMA - US Equity 
  
45618 eA SMA - US All Cap Equity 
  
4259 eA US All Cap Core Equity 
  
4271 eA US Enhanced All Cap Equity 
2 All Cap Growth 4261 eA US All Cap Growth Equity 
3 All Cap Value 4262 eA US All Cap Value Equity 
4 Large cap core 1130 eA US Large Cap Equity 
  
3860 eA US Large Cap Core Equity 
  
4267 eA US Enhanced Large Cap Equity 
  
4268 eA US Enhanced S&P 500 Equity 
  
45612 eA SMA - US Large Cap Equity 
  
45613 eA SMA - US Large Cap Core Equity 
  
55314 eA US Enhanced Russell 1000 Equity 
5 Large Cap Growth 1132 eA US Large Cap Growth Equity 
  
45614 eA SMA - US Large Cap Growth Equity 
  
55315 eA US Enhanced Russell 1000 Growth E 
6 Large Cap Value 1239 eA US Large Cap Value Equity 
  
 
45615 eA SMA - US Large Cap Value Equity 
  
 
55316 eA US Enhanced Russell 1000 Value Eq 
7  Mid Cap Core 1135 eA US Mid Cap Equity 
  
1136 eA US Mid Cap Core Equity 
  
1143 eA US Small-Mid Cap Equity 
  
1146 eA US Small-Mid Cap Core Equity 
  
4269 eA US Enhanced Mid Cap Equity 
  
45616 eA SMA - US Mid Cap Equity 
  
51322 eA SMA - US Small-Mid Cap Equity 
8 Mid Cap Growth 1137 eA US Mid Cap Growth Equity 
  
1144 eA US Small-Mid Cap Growth Equity 
9 Mid Cap Value 1138 eA US Mid Cap Value Equity 
  
1145 eA US Small-Mid Cap Value Equity 
  
1139 eA US Small Cap Equity 
10 Small Cap Core 1140 eA US Small Cap Core Equity 
  
2796 eA US Micro Cap Equity 
  
2797 eA US Micro Cap Core Equity 
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4270 eA US Enhanced Small Cap Equity 
  
45617 eA SMA - US Small Cap Equity 
11 Small Cap Growth 1141 eA US Small Cap Growth Equity 
  
2798 eA US Micro Cap Growth Equity 
12 Small Cap Value 2680 eA US Small Cap Value Equity 
  
2799 eA US Micro Cap Value Equity 
 
Panel B. Mapping of Lipper codes for mutual funds into the 12 investment styles 
 
Style No Style Name Lipper Class Name Lipper_obj_code 
1 All core  Growth and Income Funds GI 
  
Multi-Cap Core Funds MLCE 
2 All growth  Growth Funds G 
  
Multi-Cap growth Funds MLGE 
3 All value  Equity Income Funds EI 
  
Equity Income Funds EIEI 
  
Multi-Cap Value Funds MLVE 
4 Large cap core Large-Cap Core Funds LCCE 
5 
Large cap 
growth  Large-Cap Growth Funds LCGE 
6 Large cap value Large-Cap Value Funds LCVE 
    7 Mid Cap Core Mid-Cap Funds MC 
  
Mid-Cap Core Funds MCCE 
8 Mid Cap Growth  Mid-Cap Growth Funds MCGE 
9 Mid Cap Value Mid-Cap Value Funds MCVE 
    10 Small-Cap Core Micro-Cap Funds MR 
  
Small-Cap Funds SG 
  
Small-Cap Core Funds SCCE 
11 
Small-Cap 
Growth Small-Cap Growth Funds SCGE 
12 Small-Cap Value Small-Cap Value Funds SCVE 
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Table 1. Definitions of variables used in the analysis 
 
Variable Name Variable Notation Explanation 
Net return  
 
Monthly returns for equity mutual funds and institutional 
products,  net of expense ratio 
Style-adjusted return PERF 
Monthly net returns adjusted for the return of the same style 
the fund belongs to 
Total net assets (TNA) LogTNA 
Logarithm of total net assets (in $millions) at the end of each 
month (quarter) for mutual funds (institutional products) 
Mutual fund family TNA  LogMutualFAMTNA 
Logarithm of the total net assets (in $millions) of a 
management company at the end of each quarter (as reported 
in CRSP mutual fund database).  
Institutional family TNA  LogInsFAMTNA 
Logarithm of the total net assets (in $millions) at the end of 
quarter of all US domestic equity institutional products for a 
management company 
Fund expense ratio EXP 
Annual expense ratio for institutional products and mutual 
funds 
Mutual fund turnover   TURNOVER Mutual fund turnover ratio  
Mutual fund age AGE Mutual fund age since inception till current year 
TNA for matched mutual 
funds 
LogSBSTNA 
Logarithm of the sum of TNA (in $millions)  of all matched 
mutual funds for each matched institutional product 
TNA for matched 
institutional products 
LogSBSTNA 
Logarithm of the sum of TNA (in $millions) of all matched 
institutional products for each matched mutual fund 
Matched fund dummy JOINT 
Indicator that is one if an institutional product (mutual fund) 
has a matched mutual fund (institutional product) in the 
same family,  and zero otherwise  
Institutional majority 
dummy   
MAIN 
Indicator that is one if within the same fund family the total 
TNA for institutional products is greater than the that of the 
mutual funds, and zero other wise  
Mutual fund majority 
dummy 
MAIN 
Indicator that is one if within the same fund family the total 
TNA for mutual funds is greater than that of the institutional 
products, and zero other wise 
Large fund size dummy HiVal 
Indicator that is one if the TNA of an institutional product 
(mutual funds) is the largest among all institutional products 
(mutual funds) in the same fund family, zero otherwise.   
Large style size dummy HiVal 
Indicator that is one if an institutional product (mutual 
funds) belongs to the style with the largest TNA among all 
institutional product (mutual funds) styles in the same fund 
family. 
High expense dummy HiVal 
Indicator that is one if the expense ratio of an institutional 
product (mutual funds) is above the median value among all 
institutional products (mutual funds) in the same fund 
family, zero otherwise.   
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Table 2. Largest mutual fund families and institutional fund families  
 
This table lists the top ten fund families by assets under management (AUM) as of end of 2014, for the mutual fund management companies, and 
the institutional management companies, respectively. The AUM for the institutional management companies is based on the sum of fund level 
AUM among all institutional products for each institutional management company in our sample (i.e, US equity products). The AUM for the 
mutual fund management company is based on the sum of AUM of acive US domestic equity funds within each mutual fund family.  
 
Rank Mutual fund management company 
 
Rank Institutional management company 
1 Capital Research & Management  1 Vanguard 
2 Fidelity Management & Research   2 State Street Global Advisors 
3 T Rowe Price Associates   3 BlackRock 
4 Vanguard Group   4 Capital Group 
5 Franklin Templeton Investments  5 FMR Corp 
6 MFS Investment Management  6 T. Rowe Price Group 
7 Dodge & Cox  7 Northern Trust 
8 Van Kampen Asset Management  8 J.P. Morgan Investment Management 
9 American Century Investment Management   9 Wellington Management  
10 JPMorgan Funds  10 Mellon Capital Management  
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Table 3. Summary statistics for mutual funds and intuitional funds  
 
This table reports the time-series means of the cross-sectional mean and standard deviations of fund characters for both mutual funds and institutional products. 
Variable definitions are given in Table 1. Panel A reports the above summary statistics for mutual funds, and Panel B for institutional products. In addition to all 
funds, we also report the summary statistics separately for quintile portfolio of funds formed by fund TNA. (For variables “No. of mutual fund companies”, “TNA 
of mutual fund companies”,  “No. of institutional management companies”,  and “TNA of institutional management companies”, the quintiles are formed based on 
fund family TNA.) Fund TNAs are in $millions. The sample is from January 1998 through December 2014.   
43 
 
 
 
Panel A: mutual funds 
 
small TNA 2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
Large TNA 
 
all funds 
 
 
mean  stdev mean  stdev mean  stdev mean  stdev mean  stdev mean  stdev 
No. of mutual fund companies 98.79  99.29  99.26  99.32  98.90  495.57  
TNA of mutual fund companies  18.33 12.72 119.38 55.20 582.18 274.07 3048.57 1461.77 33308.00 57332.54 7400.34 28697.83 
No. of funds 329.12 
 
330.18 
 
330.32 
 
330.25 
 
329.91 
 
1650.41 
 fund net return  0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
fund style adjusted return 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 
TNA  18.30 11.86 83.20 27.60 241.74 70.26 687.50 219.05 5735.18 10209.14 1352.54 5070.35 
log(TNA) 2.41 1.04 4.27 0.35 5.36 0.30 6.41 0.33 8.06 0.90 5.30 2.02 
Log (family TNA) 5.59 2.93 7.11 2.20 8.08 1.85 8.92 1.56 10.08 1.45 7.96 2.58 
annual fund turnover ratio 1.16 1.92 0.99 1.21 0.89 0.83 0.84 0.72 0.68 0.63 0.91 1.20 
annual fund expense ratio 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
fund age 7.78 7.85 10.17 9.07 12.02 10.26 15.42 13.14 23.04 17.27 13.69 13.16 
             
Panel B: institutional products 
 
small TNA 2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
Large TNA 
 
all funds 
 No. of institutional management 
companies 
132.61 
 
133.30 
 
133.24 
 
133.29 
 
132.84 
 
665.29 
 
TNA of institutional 
management companies  
17.85 19.37 181.75 81.98 716.54 253.60 2385.97 890.06 39372.85 107271.7
7 
8501.04 50294.45 
no. of funds 508.93  509.53  509.51  509.56  509.14  2546.67  
fund net return  0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
fund style adjusted return 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 
TNA  9.27 9.63 90.69 40.19 327.22 105.93 1012.99 330.38 11557.19 40476.65 2596.90 18779.46 
log(TNA) 1.72 1.34 4.32 0.50 5.69 0.34 6.84 0.33 8.49 0.92 5.61 2.32 
Log (family TNA) 6.33 3.07 7.20 2.19 8.14 1.89 8.92 1.67 10.26 1.55 8.22 2.51 
annual expense ratio 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
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Table 4. Summary statistics for matched mutual funds and institutional funds 
 
This table reports the time series means of the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of the characters of the 
jointly managed mutual funds and institutional products, and those of their management companies. Two approaches 
of fund matching are adopted. In the “Matched by firm” approach, a mutual fund (institutional product) is considered 
as matched for a month if its management company is managing at least one institutional product (mutual fund) during 
the same month. In the “Matched by Firm/style” approach, a mutual fund (institutional product) is considered as 
matched for a month if its management company is managing at least one institutional product (mutual fund) during 
the same month that belongs to the same investment style as its counterpart. Panel A provides summary statistics at the 
management company level: Number of matched firms, the TNA of matched institutional products family (and mutual 
funds family).  Panel B reports the number of matched mutual funds per quarter and for each matched mutual fund, the 
number of matched institutional products. Panel B also reports the cross-sectional means of the cross-sectional mean 
and standard deviation of other mutual fund characters as reported in Table 3. Panel C reports the number of matched 
institutional products per quarter and for each matched institutional product, the number of matched mutual funds. 
Panel C also reports the cross-sectional means of the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of other institutional 
product characters as reported in Table 3.  Fund TNAs are in $millions. The sample is from January 1998 through 
December 2014.   
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Matched by Firm Matched by Firm/style 
Panel A: management firms  
         
No. of matched firms 89.58 
 
23.32 
 TNA of matched institutional product family  17771.60 69601.15 26539.17 67535.67 
TNA of matched mutual fund family  4876.53 14872.72 8689.69 20609.48 
     Panel B: mutual funds   
   
     No. of matched mutual funds  213.11 
 
61.50 
 No. of matched institutional products 8.62 
 
3.28 
 (per mutual fund per month)  
 
 
 fund net return  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
fund style adjusted return 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 
TNA  964.14 3087.05 711.94 1211.62 
log(TNA) 5.15 1.90 5.35 1.70 
Log (family TNA) 
7.82 2.16 8.29 1.91 
annual fund turnover ratio 0.91 0.85 0.79 0.69 
annual fund expense ratio 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
fund age 11.74 10.44 14.51 13.43 
    
 
Panel C: institutional products 
   
 
     No. of matched institutional products  343.24 
 
116.95 
 No. of matched mutual funds  5.51 
 
1.80 
 (per institutional products per month) 
    fund net return  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
fund style adjusted return 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 
TNA  3830.83 19699.15 2821.01 8691.74 
log(TNA) 6.13 2.23 6.10 2.17 
Log (family TNA) 9.06 2.11 9.38 1.83 
annual expense ratio 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
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Table 5. Effects of fund size and family size on performance  
 
This table reports panel regression results of mutual fund (institutional products) style-adjusted monthly returns on 
lagged returns, mutual fund (institutional product) TNA, mutual fund family TNA (institutional product family 
TNA), matched institutional product family TNA (mutual fund family TNA), and other fund characters. Variables 
are defined in Table 1.  A mutual fund (institutional product) is considered as matched for a month if its 
management company is managing at least one institutional product (mutual fund) during the same month. If a 
mutual fund (institutional product) has no matched counterpart, the matched institutional family TNA (mutual fund 
family TNA) is set as zero. For the right hand side variables, style-adjusted returns and mutual fund TNA are lagged 
by one month. The other variables are lagged by one quarter. The t-stats are based on clustered standard errors at the 
fund and year level. The sample is from January 1998 through December 2014.  
 
Mutual Funds  Institutional products 
 Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.00082 (2.01)  Intercept 0.00036 (2.07) 
Style-adjusted return 0.09769 (21.61)  Style-adjusted return 0.02749 (9.44) 
Total net assets (TNA) -0.0003 (-7.68)  Total net assets (TNA) -0.0002 (-14.19) 
Mutual fund family TNA  0.00017 (6.37)  Mutual fund family TNA  3.1E-05 (2.53) 
Institutional family TNA  5.2E-05 (3.65)  Institutional family TNA  9.3E-05 (5.75) 
Expense ratio -0.0536 (-2.69)  Expense ratio -0.0103 (-0.80) 
Mutual fund turnover   -0.0002 (-2.43)     
Mutual fund age 1.2E-05 (3.45)     
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Table 6. Spillover of fund size effect  
 
This table reports panel regression results of mutual fund (institutional products) style-adjusted monthly returns on 
lagged returns, mutual fund (institutional product) TNA, mutual fund family TNA (institutional product family 
TNA), TNA for matched institutional products (mutual funds), matched institutional product family TNA (mutual 
fund family TNA), and other fund characters. Variables are defined in Table 1.  A mutual fund (institutional 
product) is considered as matched for a month if its management company is managing at least one institutional 
product (mutual fund) during the same month that belongs to the same investment style as its counterpart. If a 
mutual fund (institutional product) has no matched counterpart, the matched institutional family TNA (mutual fund 
family TNA) is set as zero. For the right hand side variables, style-adjusted returns and mutual fund TNA are lagged 
by one month. The other variables are lagged by one quarter. The t-stats are based on clustered standard errors at the 
fund and year level. The sample is from January 1998 through December 2014. 
 
 
Mutual Funds  Institutional products 
 Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.00088 2.15  Intercept 0.00035 2.05 
Style-adjusted return 0.09771 21.62  Style-adjusted return 0.02749 9.43 
Total net assets (TNA) -0.0003 -7.58  Total net assets (TNA) -0.0002 -14.11 
Mutual fund family TNA  0.00017 6.24  Institutional family TNA  9.4E-05 5.80 
TNA for matched 
institutional products -4E-05 -0.74 
 TNA for matched mutual 
funds -3E-05 -0.48 
Institutional family TNA  7.4E-05 1.87  Mutual fund family TNA  7.6E-05 1.65 
Expense ratio -0.0539 -2.70  Expense ratio -0.0100 -0.77 
Mutual fund turnover   -0.0002 -2.44     
Mutual fund age 1.2E-05 3.31     
 
48 
 
Table 7. Fund characteristics and the spillover effect of family size  
 
This table reports panel regression results of mutual fund (institutional products) style-adjusted monthly returns on 
lagged returns, mutual fund (institutional product) TNA, mutual fund family TNA (institutional product family TNA), 
TNA for matched institutional products (mutual funds), matched institutional product family TNA (mutual fund family 
TNA), and other fund characters. In addition, three fund level indicators and their interaction with matched 
institutional products (mutual funds) family TNA are included: Large fund indicator, Large style indicator, and High 
expense ratio indictor, and the corresponding interaction terms. All variables are defined in Table 1.  A mutual fund 
(institutional product) is considered as matched for a month if its management company is managing at least one 
institutional product (mutual fund) during the same month that belongs to the same investment style as its counterpart. 
If a mutual fund (institutional product) has no matched counterpart, the matched institutional family TNA (mutual 
fund family TNA) is set as zero. For the right hand side variables, style-adjusted returns and mutual fund TNA are 
lagged by one month. The other variables are lagged by one quarter. Panel A reports results for Large fund indicator, 
Panel B for Large style indicator, and Panel C for High expense ratio indicator. The t-stats are based on clustered 
standard errors at the fund and year level. The sample is from January 1998 through December 2014. 
 
 
Panel A. Fund size 
Mutual Funds  Institutional products 
 Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.0011 2.64  Intercept 0.00045 2.39 
Large fund indicator -0.0003 -2.20  Large fund indicator -0.0001 -1.23 
Style-adjusted return 0.09768 21.60  Style-adjusted return 0.02748 9.43 
Total net assets (TNA) -0.0003 -6.42  Total net assets (TNA) -0.0002 -11.59 
Mutual fund family TNA  0.00014 4.28  Mutual fund family TNA  7.4E-05 1.60 
TNA for matched 
institutional products -5E-05 -0.91 
 TNA for matched mutual 
funds -3E-05 -0.50 
Institutional family TNA  5.4E-05 1.36  Institutional family TNA  7.8E-05 3.87 
Institutional family TNA 
*Large fund indicator 0.00013 2.97 
 Mutual fund family TNA 
*Large fund indicator 2.9E-05 0.40 
Expense ratio -0.054 -2.70  Expense ratio -0.0108 -0.84 
Mutual fund turnover   -0.0002 -2.43     
Mutual fund age 1.2E-05 3.37     
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Panel B. Style 
Mutual Funds  Institutional products 
 Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.00105 2.52  Intercept 0.0005 2.76 
Large style indicator -0.0002 -2.06  Large style indicator -0.0002 -2.49 
Style-adjusted return 0.09769 21.61  Style-adjusted return 0.02748 9.43 
Total net assets (TNA) -0.0003 -7.06  Total net assets (TNA) -0.0002 -12.91 
Mutual fund family TNA  0.00015 5.37  Mutual fund family TNA  7.2E-05 1.27 
TNA for matched 
institutional products -4E-05 -0.74 
 TNA for matched mutual 
funds -3E-05 -0.44 
Institutional family TNA  3.5E-05 0.84  Institutional family TNA  8.1E-05 4.71 
Institutional family TNA 
*Large style indicator 8.9E-05 2.47 
 Mutual fund  family TNA 
*Large style indicator 8.7E-06 0.21 
Expense ratio -0.0541 -2.70  Expense ratio -0.0114 -0.89 
Mutual fund turnover   -0.0002 -2.44     
Mutual fund age 1.2E-05 3.27     
 
Panel C. Expense 
Mutual Funds  Institutional products 
 Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.0007 1.84  Intercept 0.00037 2.18 
High expense indicator 0.00021 1.90  High expense indicator 9.2E-05 1.29 
Style-adjusted return 0.09768 21.61  Style-adjusted return 0.02745 9.42 
Total net assets (TNA) -0.0003 -7.47  Total net assets (TNA) -0.0002 -13.93 
Mutual fund family TNA  0.00017 6.39  Mutual fund family TNA  1.5E-05 0.31 
TNA for matched 
institutional products -3E-05 -0.51 
 TNA for matched mutual 
funds -4E-05 -0.63 
Institutional family TNA  5.4E-05 1.16  Institutional family TNA  9.3E-05 5.77 
Institutional family TNA 
*High expense indicator 2.9E-05 0.77 
 Mutual fund family TNA 
*High expense indicator 0.00012 2.95 
Expense ratio -0.0555 -2.69  Expense ratio -0.0216 -1.46 
Mutual fund turnover   -0.0002 -2.45     
Mutual fund age 1.3E-05 3.57     
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Table 8. Regression analysis on performance transfer between mutual funds and institutional 
funds 
 
This table reports panel regression results of mutual fund (institutional products) style-adjusted monthly returns on 
the Matched fund indicator, The Mutual fund (Institutional product) majority indicator, as well as all the other 
variables listed in Table 5.  All variables are defined in Table 1.  A mutual fund (institutional product) is considered 
as matched for a month if its management company is managing at least one institutional product (mutual fund) 
during the same month. If a mutual fund (institutional product) has no matched counterpart, the matched 
institutional family TNA (mutual fund family TNA) is set as zero. For the right hand side variables, style-adjusted 
returns and mutual fund TNA are lagged by one month. The other variables are lagged by one quarter. The sample is 
from January 1998 through December 2014.  
 
 
Mutual Funds  Institutional products 
 Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.00075 1.81  Intercept 0.00052 2.50 
Matched fund indicator 0.00054 3.58  Matched fund indicator 0.00047 1.63 
Mutual fund majority 
indicator -0.0001 -0.61 
 Institutional majority 
indicator -0.0004 -1.36 
Style-adjusted return 0.09767 21.61  Style-adjusted return 0.02459 8.56 
Total net assets (TNA) -0.0003 -7.69  Total net assets (TNA) -0.0002 -13.19 
Mutual fund family TNA  0.00018 6.54  Institutional family TNA  7.2E-05 4.76 
Expense ratio -0.0534 -2.68  Expense ratio -0.0316 -1.50 
Mutual fund turnover   -0.0002 -2.43     
Mutual fund age 1.3E-05 3.53     
 
